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Abstract
We propose two control ﬂow analyses for the Java bytecode. They safely approxi-
mate the set of permissions granted/denied to code at run-time. This static infor-
mation helps optimizing the implementation of the stack inspection algorithm.
1 Introduction
A main innovation of the Java platform concerns its approach to security:
the language comes equipped with constructs and mechanisms for expressing
and enforcing security policies. Since the code actually executed is on the
form of an intermediate object-oriented language – the bytecode – bytecode
veriﬁcation is the basic building block of Java security.
Over the past few years, there has been considerable eﬀort in developing
formal models of the Java bytecode veriﬁer. Some authors showed that the
problem of bytecode veriﬁcation can be formally understood and described at
static time using type systems [3,4,14]. All the proposals are proved to en-
joy the type soundness properties (on the bytecode fragments they consider).
Also, the type inference algorithm can be turned into a correct bytecode ver-
iﬁer, see e.g. [2,5,10].
Another crucial aspect of the Java security architecture is the dynamic
check of the permissions granted to running code. Roughly, one has to make
sure that whenever a principal invokes a certain method, it has the rights
to. At run-time, permissions are enforced by stack inspection: a permission
is granted, provided that it belongs to all principals on the call stack. An
exception are the so-called privileged operations, which are allowed to execute
any code granted to their principal, regardless of the calling sequence.
Since the analysis of stack frames may be expensive, the run-time over-
head due to stack inspection may grow very high: eﬀective techniques which
improve and optimize stack inspection are therefore in order.
In this paper we develop a static analysis which improves run-time check-
ing of permissions. We reduce the number of frames to be examined, while
maintaining the same accuracy of the plain stack inspection algorithm. Also,
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our analysis may be used for optimizing bytecode, by moving checks where
they are actually needed, and by removing redundant ones.
Our approach is based on Control Flow Analysis (CFA) [9], a static tech-
nique for predicting safe and computable approximations to the set of values
that the objects of a program may assume during its execution. These approx-
imations are then used to analyze properties of programs in a safe manner:
if a property holds at static time, then it will always hold at run-time. The
vice-versa may not be true: the analysis may “err on the safe side”. CFA
and other static program analysis techniques are generally more eﬃcient than
program veriﬁcation, and for that reason more approximate, because the focus
is on the fully automatic processing of large programs.
Our main technical contribution is the formulation of a couple of control
ﬂow analyses over an abstract representation of Java programs. This abstract
representation specializes the usual call graph, focussing on permission checks
and method invocations (and protection domains), similarly to [8]. Call graphs
are given an operational semantics. Essentially, the states that a program can
pass through are represented by stacks σ, made of nodes of the call graph,
each interpreted as an abstraction of the actual stack frames. The control
point is the top n of the stack σ : n, and a computation step is represented by
a transition between stacks, written as σ ✄ σ′.
For each node n our ﬁrst analysis computes an approximation, i.e. a sub-
set δ(n) of those permissions that are denied to n, in every run leading to
n. Similarly, our second analysis computes a subset γ(n) of the permissions
granted to n in every run leading to n. Both analyses are correct with respect
to the operational semantics. Suppose that n is a security check of permission
P , and that P ∈ δ(n) (resp. P ∈ γ(n)). Then, whenever there is a compu-
tation [] ✄ . . . ✄ σ : n, the security check always fails (resp. succeeds). The
approximations computed by our analyses are then used to reduce the depth
at which the stack inspection algorithm stops. When checking privileges to-
wards a permission P , it suﬃces to reach a frame m such that P ∈ δ(m) or
P ∈ γ(m). In the ﬁrst case an AccessControlException is raised, while in
the second one the check succeeds.
2 Program model
We represent bytecode programs as oriented graphs where only security checks
and control ﬂow are made explicit. On them, we base our analyses.
A call graph is a triple G = (N,E, S), where:
• N is the set of nodes, including a distinguished element ⊥N . Each node
n ∈ N \ {⊥N} is associated with a label (n), describing the control ﬂow
primitive represented by the node. Labels give rise to three kinds of nodes:
call nodes, representing method invocation, return nodes, which represent
return from a method, and check nodes, which enforce the access control
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policy. Roughly, we can think of a node labelled check(P) has having the
same meaning of an AccessController.checkPermission(P) instruction
in the Java language. The distinguished node ⊥N plays the technical role
of a single, isolated entry point.
• E = Ecall unionmulti Etrans unionmulti Eentry ⊆ N × (N \ {⊥N}) is the set of edges. Edges
are split into call edges n −→ n′ ∈ Ecall , modelling inter-procedural ﬂow,
and transfer edges n  n′ ∈ Etrans , which instead correspond to intra-
procedural ﬂow. Moreover, we have the set of entry edges •−→ n ∈ Eentry ,
containing all pairs (⊥N , n) for n ∈ S. The ⊥N element only appears in
entry edges.
• S ⊆ N \ {⊥N} is the non-empty set of entry nodes. We assume that a
program may have many entry points, as it actually happens with programs
designed to be launched both as applets and as stand-alone applications.
In order to give a speciﬁcation of the access control policy being consistent
with the one introduced by the JDK 1.2, we endow each node n ∈ N \ {⊥N}
with the following additional information:
• Permissions(n), the set of permissions associated with n. The Java secu-
rity architecture bounds permissions to whole protection domains, that our
model does not handle explicitly. We only require that, whenever n  n′,
both n and n′ carry the same permission set.
• Priv(n), a boolean predicate indicating whether n represents privileged code.
In what follows, we assume that all the information above is extracted
from the bytecode, e.g. by the constructions presented in [7,8,9].
Throughout the paper we will make use of an example taken from [8], that
describes a small e-commerce application. The call graph extracted from the
Java program is shown in ﬁgure 1 (for more details, we refer the reader to
[8]). Circled nodes represent blocks of privileged code. The mapping between
protection domains and nodes is illustrated in Fig. 2.
The operational semantics of call graphs is deﬁned by a transition sys-
tem whose conﬁgurations are sequences of nodes, modelling call stacks. The
transition relation is deﬁned in Fig. 3 (the deﬁnition of the JDK predicate is
discussed later on).
We also need a reachability relation  stating when the execution of a program
G can lead to a given state:
G  []
G  σ σ ✄ σ′
G  σ′
We say that a state σ is reachable by G if and only if G  σ.
Here, we use a slightly simpliﬁed version of the full access control algorithm
presented in [6], as we let privileged frames to exploit all of their own permis-
sions. The simpliﬁed algorithm performs a top-down scan of the call stack.
Each frame in the stack refers to the protection domain containing the class to
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n17: return
n16: check(Pread)
read()
n19: return
n18: check(Pwrite)
write()
n6: call
n7: call
clyde()
n9: call
n10: return
n8: check(Pcanpay)
canpay()
n13: call
n14: call
n11: check(Pdebit)
n15: return
n12: call
debit()
n1: call
n2: call
main()
n3: call
n4: call
spender()
n5: call
Fig. 1. A call graph.
which the called method belongs. As soon as a frame is found whose protec-
tion domain has not the required permission, an AccessControlException
is raised. The algorithm succeeds when a privileged frame is found that car-
ries the required permission, or when all frames have been visited. A formal
speciﬁcation of this algorithm is given in Fig. 4, that deﬁnes JDK.
We stress an important point here. In the JDK 1.2 security architecture,
a permission P may be granted to a piece of code, lying inside a protection
domain D, even if P does not belong to the permissions explicitly associated
Protection Domain Methods Permissions
Client spender() {Pdebit , Pcanpay}
Unknown clyde() ∅
Provider canpay(), debit() {Pdebit , Pcanpay , Pread , Pwrite}
System main(), read(), write() Permission
Fig. 2. Protection domains.
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n ∈ S
[] ✄ [n]
[✄∅]
(n) = call n −→ n′
σ : n ✄ σ : n : n′
[✄call]
(n) = check(P) σ : n  JDK(P ) n  n′
σ : n ✄ σ : n′
[✄check]
(m) = return n  n′
σ : n : m ✄ σ : n′
[✄return]
Fig. 3. Operational semantics.
[]  JDK(P )
[JDK∅]
P ∈ Permissions(n) σ  JDK(P )
σ : n  JDK(P )
[JDK≺]
P ∈ Permissions(n) Priv(n)
σ : n  JDK(P )
[JDKPriv ]
Fig. 4. Speciﬁcation of the access control policy.
with D. 1 Our model prevents this behaviour, because the JDK rules ensure
that:
∀n ∈ N, σ ∈ N∗. P /∈ Permissions(n) =⇒ σ : n  JDK(P )
Note also that our inference rules for JDK are ﬁxed, as well as those for
✄. So we are prevented from modelling permissions like AllPermission and
FilePermission("*","write"), as they may breach security by altering the
Java system binaries.
In the following, we will say that a permission P is denied (resp. granted)
to a state σ if σ  JDK(P ) (resp. σ  JDK(P )). Also, the ﬁnite set of all
permissions referenced to in a given call graph will be denoted by Permission.
Back to our example, consider node n16: both callers n9 and n13 are priv-
ileged and have the permission Pread. Hence, the security check at n16 will
1 This may happen through the implies() method.
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DP in(n) =
⋃
(m,n)∈E
{DP out(m,n)}
DP out(m,n) =


Permissions(n) if •−→ n
DP call(m) ∩ Permissions(n) if m −→ n
DP trans(m) if m  n
DP call(n) =


Permissions(n) if Priv(n)
DP in(n) otherwise
DP trans(n) =


∅ if (n) = check(P) and kill(n, P )
⋃
(m,n)∈E
P∈DP out (m,n)
{DP out(m,n)} if (n) = check(P) and ¬kill(n, P )and ¬Priv(n)
DP in(n) otherwise
kill(n, P ) =def ∀(m,n) ∈ E. P /∈ DP out(m,n)
Fig. 5. The Denied Permissions Analysis.
always pass. The same holds for n18, as its only caller is the privileged n14.
Now consider n11: one of its callers (n4) has permission Pdebit, while the other
(n6) has not. Indeed, the security check at n11 is necessary. Also, note that no
execution involving clyde will ever pass the check in n11: then the permission
Pcanpay is always granted to both callers of n8 (n3 and n12), and the check at
n8 turns out to be redundant, too.
Our static analyses aim at discovering the redundant checks, i.e. those
that always succeed, as well as those that always fail.
3 Static analyses
Our ﬁrst analysis is called Denied Permissions Analysis (DP for short). It
computes, for each program node n, a safe approximation, i.e. a subset of the
set of permissions that are denied to any state σ : n. The analysis is deﬁned
by the system of control ﬂow equations DP (G) in Fig. 5 (actually it deﬁnes
the complement DP of DP w.r.t. Permission). Note that DP is a forward
analysis, and that we are interested in the largest sets satisfying the equalities.
The control ﬂow information is represented through a ﬁnite property space
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L = Lin×Lout ×Lcall ×Ltrans , where Lin ,Lcall ,Ltrans are total function spaces
from N to P(Permission), while Lout is a total function space from E to
P(Permission). Assuming that P(Permission) is partially ordered by ⊇, a
standard construction equips each of these spaces with a pointwise order. As
an example, the set Lin is partially ordered by the relation in given by:
lin in l′in =def ∀n ∈ N. lin(n) ⊇ l′in(n)
Similarly, we deﬁne a join operator on these spaces. Back to our example:
lin unionsqin l′in =def λn : N. lin(n) ∩ l′in(n)
With the above, our function spaces turn out to be ﬁnite complete lattices.
Thus, also L is a ﬁnite complete lattice.
The equation system in Fig. 5 deﬁnes a transfer function FDP between
elements of this lattice, i.e. FDP : L → L. Any solution δ ∈ L of the control
ﬂow equations must satisfy δ = FDP(δ): in this case, we write δ |= DP (G).
Actually, FDP is a monotonic (and continuous) function, therefore the chain
⊥L  F(⊥L)  F2(⊥L)  · · · eventually stabilises to the largest solution
of the equation system.
We can now state the correctness of our DP analysis. For every reachable
state σ : n, the permissions denied to n are a superset of the δcall(n) component
of any solution.
Theorem 3.1 (Correctness of DP Analysis)
Let G be a call graph, G  σ : n and δ |= DP (G). Then:
P ∈ δcall(n) =⇒ σ : n  JDK(P )
The intuition follows on how a solution is built. The permissions non-
denied at the entry of a node are the union of those (non-denied) at the exit
of all its callers. Call nodes generate non-denied permissions only if they
are privileged; otherwise they propagate the non-denied permissions of their
entry points. A check node propagates the permissions of the callers that may
pass the check. Return nodes have no outgoing edges, so they are irrelevant
here. Note that permissions can be discarded when crossing the boundaries of
protection domains. As an example, the δout component for the edge n6 → n11
in Fig. 1 is:
δout(n6, n11) = δcall(n6) ∩ Permissions(n11) ⊆ δcall(n6) = δin(n6)
= δout(n2, n6) ∪ δout(n7, n6)
= (δcall(n2) ∪ δcall(n7)) ∩ Permissions(n6) = ∅.
(1)
Our second analysis is called Granted Permissions Analysis (GP for short).
Similarly to DP, it gives, for every node n, a safe approximation of the set of
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GPin(n) =
⋂
(m,n)∈E
{GPout(m,n)}
GPout(m,n) =


Permissions(n) if •−→ n
GPcall(m) ∩ Permissions(n) if m −→ n
GPtrans(m) if m  n
GPcall(n) =


Permissions(n) if Priv(n)
GPin(n) otherwise
GPtrans(n) =


∅ if (n) = check(P) and kill(n, P )
⋂
(m,n)∈E
P∈DP out (m,n)
{GPout(m,n)} ∪ {P} if (n) = check(P) and ¬kill(n, P )and ¬Priv(n)
GPin(n) otherwise
Fig. 6. The Granted Permissions Analysis.
permissions that are granted to any state with top n. The analysis is deﬁned
by the system of equations GP (G) in Fig. 6. Also GP is a forward analysis,
and we look for the largest sets satisfying the equalities.
The permissions granted at the entry of a node are those granted at the
exit of all its callers. Call nodes generate granted permissions only if they
are privileged; otherwise they propagate those at their entry points. A check
node generates both the permissions it enforces and those granted to all of
the callers that may pass the check. As an example of the GP analysis, we
compute the set of permissions granted to node n16:
γcall(n16) = γin(n16) = γout(n9, n16) ∩ γout(n13, n16)
= (γcall(n9) ∩ γcall(n13)) ∩ Permissions(n16)
= Permissions(n9) ∩ Permissions(n13)
= {Pdebit , Pcanpay , Pread , Pwrite}
(2)
We can now state the correctness of our GP analysis. For every reach-
able state σ : n, the permissions granted to n are a superset of the γcall(n)
component of any solution.
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Theorem 3.2 (Correctness of GP Analysis)
Let G be a call graph, G  σ : n and γ |= GP (G). Then:
P ∈ γcall(n) =⇒ σ : n  JDK(P ).
Back to our example, the correctness theorem for GP ensures that any state
whose top node is n16 will pass the security check, because Pread ∈ γcall(n16)
(see Eq. 2). Thus, the GP analysis statically captures the redundancy of
this check, which however is dynamically tested, as intuitively discussed in
Section 2. This is an example of how our analysis can be used to optimize
stack inspection by removing redundant checks from the code.
Figure 7 displays the largest solutions of the DP and GP analyses for the
e-commerce example.
The largest solutions of the DP and the GP analyses can be computed
by a slight adaptation of a standard worklist algorithm (see [9]). Our ba-
sic operations are the binary set union and intersection. Their computation
requires a number of steps linear on |Permission|, i.e. the size of the per-
missions set. Then a (coarse) upper bound on the number of basic opera-
tions performed by the a naive implementation of the worklist algorithm is
O(|E|2 · |Permission|2).
n δcall(n) γcall(n)
n1 − n2 ∅ Permission
n3 − n5 {Pread , Pwrite} {Pdebit , Pcanpay}
n6 − n7 {Pdebit , Pcanpay , Pread , Pwrite} ∅
n8 {Pread , Pwrite} {Pdebit , Pcanpay}
n9 ∅ {Pdebit , Pcanpay , Pread , Pwrite}
n10 {Pread , Pwrite} {Pdebit , Pcanpay}
n11 {Pread , Pwrite} ∅
n12 {Pread , Pwrite} {Pdebit , Pcanpay}
n13 − n14 ∅ {Pdebit , Pcanpay , Pread , Pwrite}
n15 {Pread , Pwrite} {Pdebit , Pcanpay}
n16 − n19 ∅ {Pdebit , Pcanpay , Pread , Pwrite}
Fig. 7. The largest solutions for DP and GP .
4 Optimized stack inspection
The correctness results of the previous section shed light on a possible opti-
mization of the stack inspection algorithm. When an access control decision
has to be made towards a permission P , the call stack (with nodes in place
of protection domains) is examined top-down as follows. Assume n to be the
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currently scanned node. If P ∈ δcall(n), then an AccessControlException
is thrown. Otherwise, if P ∈ γcall(n) the algorithm succeeds. If neither case
occurs, the search goes on.
This optimized stack inspection algorithm is speciﬁed in Fig. 8 and is
proved to yield the same results of the standard JDK.
[]  JDK(P )
[JDK
∅
]
P /∈ δcall(n) σ  JDK(P )
σ : n  JDK(P )
[JDKδ ]
P ∈ γcall(n)
σ : n  JDK(P )
[JDKγ ]
Fig. 8. Speciﬁcation of the optimized access control policy.
Theorem 4.1 (Correctness of JDK)
Let G be a call graph and G  σ. Then, for any permission P :
σ  JDK(P ) ⇐⇒ σ  JDK(P )
5 Concluding Remarks
In this paper we developed two Control Flow Analyses for the Java byte-
code. The ﬁrst analysis yields a safe approximation of the set of permissions
granted to bytecode at run-time, and the second one approximates the denied
permissions. The analyses provide us with the basis for reducing the run-
time overhead due to stack inspection. Here, we focussed on Java bytecode,
however the same static techniques can be applied to deal with programming
languages or systems whose security architecture provides dynamic checking
of permissions through stack inspection (e.g. C [19]).
Many authors advocated the use of static techniques to optimize the check
of security properties. Walker [16] develops a notion of typed compilation
schemata: types encode assertions about program security ensuring that no
run-time violation of the security properties will occur. Another approach
is proposed by Jensen, Le Me`tayer and Thorn [8]. They formalize classes of
security properties (including stack inspection) through a linear time temporal
logic. Then, model checking is used to prove that local security checks enforce
a given global security policy.
The problem of optimizing stack inspection is addressed by Wallach and
Felten in [17,18] by exploiting a belief logic [1] and a technique called security-
passing style. Pottier, Skalka and Smith [11] introduce a type system to model
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a simpliﬁed version of Java stack inspection. These two approaches implicitly
characterize the checks thar are redundant, while our control ﬂow analyses do
it directly.
The extension of our proposal to the full access control policy requires the
call graph construction algorithm to single out the program points where new
threads can be generated. This step seems to be the hard part of the job.
Indeed, we feel then that our analyses only require slight modiﬁcations.
Our program model does not handle dynamic linking features of Java.
Actually, the whole program is available prior the construction of its call
graph. The extension of our approach to cope with dynamic linking requires
substantial eﬀorts. The ﬁrst step consists in linking dynamically the relevant
call graphs. Then the available solutions for the various program fragments
have to be combined. Some preliminary work on data ﬂow analysis taking
care of dynamic linking can be found in [13,15].
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